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in general, and allows the court and jury to base their decision in a
close case upon scientific findings instead of suspicion or emotion.
Brown manifests a trend in Florida toward greater acceptance of
polygraph results, since it goes further than prior stipulated admission cases in allowing the judge to consider the results on a post-trial
motion in the absence of a jury. The liberality of the Brown opinion,
especially if coupled with state licensing of operators and standardization of machines, may well indicate that the day is approaching when
the rule against admissibility of lie detector results, long unquestioned
by the courts, will be discarded in Florida.
STEPHEN J. POWELL

PROCEDURE: DEATH AND REBIRTH OF THE NONSUIT
Crews v. Dobson, 177 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1965)
In a negligence action after the jury had been impaneled and
sworn, the plaintiff moved for a nonsuit. The defendant then moved
for a dismissal and asked that judgment be entered with prejudice.
The circuit court denied defendant's motion and recognized the nonsuit taken by plaintiff. The First District Court of Appeal reversed,1
holding that defendant's motion for dismissal with prejudice should
have been granted. The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari
and HELD, Florida Statutes, section 54.09, recognizing a plaintiff's
right to take a nonsuit before the jury retires, is inconsistent with
the 1962 revision of Rule 1.35 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides for the dismissal of actions. The court said the elimination of the clause from Rule 1.35 that provided "nothing stated
herein shall preclude a nonsuit from being taken pursuant to any
applicable statute" was intended to do away with nonsuits. Judgment

affirmed.2
1. Dobson v. Crews, 164 So. 2d 252 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
2. Crews v. Dobson, 177 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1965).
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At early common law a plaintiff could take a nonsuit at any stage
of the proceedings without prejudicing his ability to bring a subsequent action upon the same cause.3 A later English statute4 eliminated
the plaintiff's right to take a nonsuit after the verdict. The absolute
right to take a nonsuit prior to verdict, however, remained. By statute
Florida recognized a plaintiff's right to nonsuit as early as 1828, but
limited it by requiring such action to be taken "before the jury retire
from the bar." 5 Subsequent to enactment of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1954, and prior to the revision of Rule 1.35 in
1962, the nonsuit was recognized by Florida courts as a proper procedure in actions at law.6 The decision in the principal case is based
upon the court's holding that the revision of the rule in 1962 was,
in fact, intended to eliminate the nonsuit entirely. This, however,
was far from being clear prior to the principal case. The Second
District Court of Appeal recognized the propriety of nonsuits in
Peaslee v. Michalshi7 in August 1964 only to disavow their use less
than a year later. s Before the 1962 revision the Third District Court
in Ramsey v. Aronson 9 tacitly recognized nonsuits. The First District
Court of Appeal rejected nonsuits in the present case. There were
several reasons for the existence of this confusion and uncertainty.
Rule 1.35 as amended in 1962 made no reference to the propriety of
nonsuits, but merely left it to a negative inference. On the other
hand, Florida Statutes, section 54.09, which authorized nonsuits, remained on the books. Because nonsuits were deeply rooted in our
common law heritage, and because of the absence of any clear articulation by the supreme court, prior to this case, of the reasons for
the 1962 amendment to Rule 1.35, it is little wonder that there
was uncertainty as to the effect of the 1962 revision.
Crews v. Dobson settled this confusion and nonsuits were officially
removed from Florida procedure. The death of the nonsuit was short
3. A brief history of the nonsuit is set out in the district court opinion of this
case, Dobson v. Crews, 164 So. 2d 252, 255 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
4. 2 Hen. 4, c.7. See National Broadway Bank of the City of N.Y. v. Lesley,
31 Fla. 56, 12 So. 525 (1893).
5. FLA. STAT. §54.09 (1963) preserves in substance the language of the original
statute. Act of Nov. 23, 1828, §§69-70. Although FLA. STAr. §54.09 (1963) is still
on the books, the principal case holds that it has been superseded by the 1962

revision of

FLA.

R.Civ. P.1.35.

6. See Welgoss v. End, 112 So. 2d 390 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959); Ramsey v. Aronson,
99 So. 2d 643 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1957); Hinchee v. Fisher, 93 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1957),
rev'd on other grounds, Hardee v. Gordon Thompson Chevrolet, Inc., 154 So. 2d
174, 177 (1st D.C.A. Fla 1963). See also Note, Florida's Unique Dismissal - The NonSuit, 13 U. FLA. L. Rav. 105 (1960) for a thorough discussion of the nonsuit prior
to the 1962 revision of Rule 1.35.
7. 167 So. 2d 242 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
8. Cook v. Lichtblau, 176 So. 2d 523 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
9. 99 So. 2d 643 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1957).
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lived, however. A few weeks later the court, pursuant to its rulemaking power, again revised Rule 1.35 effective January 1966. This
revision gives the plaintiff the equivalent of an absolute right to one
voluntary nonsuit. In its present form Rule 1.35, section (a) (1) reads
as follows:l °
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By parties.Except in actions wherein property has been
seized or is in the custody of the court, an action may be dismissed by plaintiff without leave of court (i) by serving a
notice of dismissal at any time before a hearing on motion for
summary judgment, or if none is served, or if such motion is
denied before retirement of the jury in a case tried before a
jury or before submission of a nonjury case to a court for decision, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all
parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation the dismissal is
without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates
as an adjudication upon the merits when served by a plaintiff
who has once dismissed in any court an action based on or including the same claim.
The historical distinction between the voluntary dismissal and the
voluntary nonsuit no longer exists and, when properly invoked, their
effect is the same." In Florida prior to 1962, however, the point in
the litigation when each could be invoked, without a stipulation by all
the parties or by order of the court, made for a distinction between
the two procedures. The voluntary nonsuit could be taken at the
whim of the plaintiff at any time prior to the retirement of the jury,
whereas the plaintiff could take a voluntary dismissal as a matter of
right only if he did so before the defendant had filed his answer or
made a motion for summary judgment. The 1962 revision of Rule
1.35, according to the court in Crews, abolished the voluntary nonsuit.
The latest revision of the rule, however, revives the substance of the
voluntary nonsuit, by extending the absolute right to take one voluntary dismissal to any time prior to the retirement of the jury or before
submission of a nonjury case to the court for decision.12
10. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.35 (b) (1965). (Emphasis added.)
17 Am. Jum. Dismissal, Discontinuance, and Nonsuit §2 (1957).
12. Whether we call the provision a voluntary nonsuit, an expanded voluntary
dismissal, or, as the committee recommending the changes called it, a "provision
for one absolute discontinuance," does not alter the substantive effect of the rule
as a revival of the unnecessary dilatQry procedure that allows the plaintiff the
right to send the defendant and his witnesses home at any point during the trial

11.

before the retirement of the jury or submission of a nonjury case to the court for
decision.
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It should be emphasized that this new provision providing for one
voluntary dismissal as of right is not limited to cases "on trial," as
was Florida Statutes, section 54.09; the right extends to nonjury cases
as well as to actions at law. It had been indicated that the "on trial"
provisions of Florida Statutes, section 54.09, would restrict the use of
the statute to actions at law.13 In this manner, the new "nonsuit"
provision expands the previous practice. Rule 1.35 (a) (2), which contains the provision for a voluntary dismissal at a party's instance upon
order of the court on such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper, remains unchanged to protect the surprised or otherwise prejudiced litigant.
The Florida Supreme Court's decision to abrogate Crews by this
latest rule change is somewhat surprising, particularly since the court
was considering the 1965 amendments to the Rules concurrently with
14
Crews. The court alludes to this in the Crews opinion:
Our first thought was that since this court is considering
now the question whether or not a further rule should be adopted to clarify the procedure in this respect, we should not
anticipate the court's action as a rule-making body; our second
and abiding thought is that we would do a service to the Bench
and Bar by settling the matter in the present litigation.
The voluntary nonsuit has often proved unsatisfactory, for it
frequently results in wasted time, effort, and expense. For example,
in a case in which the defendant has called his witnesses from great
distances, a jury has been impaneled, and witnesses' testimony has
been taken, the plaintiff, sensing a verdict is about to be directed
against him, may have the action "dismissed," only to bring the
suit again at a later date. A federal district court judge once said:
"It [is] an outrageous imposition not only on the defendant but also
on the court." 15
Rule 1.35 as it stood prior to January 1966 and the federal rule
regarding dismissals's were substantially identical and afforded litigants the same rights and protections. The federal rule did away
with what Moore has referred to as "that highly unsatisfactory practice' 17 of allowing plaintiffs, as a matter of right, to take a voluntary
nonsuit at any time before retirement of the jury. The pre-1966
13. See Welgoss v. End, 112 So. 2d 390 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959) (dictum). See
also Note, Florida's Unique Dismissal-The Non-Suit, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 105
(1960).
14. 177 So. 2d 202, 204 (Fla. 1965).
15. McCann v. Bentley Stores Corp., 34 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Mo. 1940).
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 41.
17. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE §41.05, at 1054 (2d ed. 1964).
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Florida rule, like the federal rule, was more than adequate to protect
the rights of both parties. As the Florida Supreme Court pointed out
in Crews:18
[A] study of the section [1.35] in its entirety seems abundantly
to protect parties litigant in any situation which theretofore
could have been relieved by resorting to nonsuit . ..
[A]
plaintiff may dismiss without court order any time he pleases
before service of an answer or presentation of a motion for
summary judgment. He may also dismiss by stipulation of the
parties....
If, as the court has shown, "ample remedy is afforded litigants under
the other provision of the rule,"'19 why has the court chosen to revive
a plaintiff's right to dismiss his causes without rhyme or reason simply
because they do so before the jury retires from the bar or before submission of a nonjury case to the court for decision?
No doubt plaintiffs' attorneys welcomed the restoration of the
right to one voluntary nonsuit. It appears, however, that the disadvantages occasioned by a plaintiff's use of this dilatory procedure more
than offset the advantages. A defendant may now be subjected to an
unwanted time-consuming and expensive delay of his trial. The courts
will have to reset these partially completed nonsuited trials at a later
date, thereby increasing the demand on their already overburdened
schedules and lengthening their existing overcrowded dockets. Surely
the court in Crews was not engaging in idle chatter when it said: "the
field of dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff seems well tilled."20
The voluntary dismissal rule as it now exists in Florida is a highly
questionable procedural remedy. To stay in line with the intendment
of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which is, as the Florida Supreme Court said in adopting the original rules in 1954, to "aid dispatch in litigation, lower the cost of litigation, simplify procedure
and aid in the dispensation of justice ... - " the court should again
revise Rule 1.35. The plaintiff's absolute right to one voluntary dismissal should be limited to the time before the defendant serves his
answer or before a motion for summary judgment is filed.
DAvm D. MCFADYEN

18. 177 So. 2d 202, 205 (Fla. 1965).
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
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